




On the Economics of Others
by
Oded Stark






























Mailing Address: ZEF, University of Bonn October 2013 
      Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 
      D-53113 Bonn 
      Germany 
       
 




Lecture delivered on the occasion of receipt of the degree of 





We relate to others in two important ways: we care about others, and we care 
about how we fare in comparison to others. In some contexts, these two forms of 
relatedness interact. Caring about others can conveniently be labeled altruism. 
Caring about how we fare in comparison with others who fare better than 
ourselves can conveniently be labeled relative deprivation. I provide examples 
of domains in which the incorporation of altruism and relative deprivation can 
point to novel perspectives and suggest rethinking, and possibly revising, long-
held views. And I show that there are domains in which consideration of relative 
deprivation can substitute for the prevalence of altruism, and vice versa. I 
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We relate to others in two important ways: we care about others, and we care 
about how we fare in comparison to others. In some contexts, these two forms of 
relatedness interact.  
 
Caring about others can conveniently be labeled altruism. Caring about how we 
fare in comparison with others who fare better than ourselves can conveniently 
be labeled relative deprivation. 
 
Practicing altruism is giving up some for the sake of another getting more. To 
appreciate how powerful a force altruism is, consider a one-shot two-player 
prisoner’s dilemma game with payoffs, starting from the bottom left and going 
clockwise through the four cells,  
 
3, 3 1, 4 
4, 1 2, 2 
 
we all know that the outcome of this game is (2, 2) which, for both players, is 
worse than (3, 3). But if each player cares about the other player as much as he 
cares about himself, the payoffs become 
 
3, 3 2.5, 2.5 
2.5, 2.5 2, 2 
 
and the players hit the superior (3, 3) outcome. In this case of initial payoffs    
(4, 1), (3, 3), (2, 2), and (1, 4), it is not even necessary for the weights to be 
equal; as a quick calculation will show, if each player attaches a weight of a 
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little less than 2/3 to his own payoff, and a little more than 1/3 to the payoff of 
the other player, the (3, 3) outcome will be reached.1 
 
Altruism is not only a catalyst for transforming single-shot games, it also 
cements long-term implicit contracts. A family in a village in a poor country 
subsidizes the migration of a family member, trusting him or her to share, in due 
course, his or her earnings from work in faraway lands, with this trust premised 
on the migrant family member being altruistic toward his or her family.2 
 
The altruism of a migrant toward the family left behind can also explain what 
otherwise might be expected to be the opposite. There is a widely held 
perception that strong ties with the country of origin, in particular with the 
family left behind, hinder assimilation, and that weak links are conducive to 
assimilation. But if a migrant derives utility from his or her family having more 
income, if remittances bring about this increase, and if it is necessary to 
assimilate in order to secure a higher income and thus be able to remit, then we 
can see how altruism - caring about the wellbeing of the family that stays behind 
- encourages assimilation; indeed, we can even anticipate that the stronger the 
altruism, the higher the optimal effort to assimilate.3 
 
But before we get too excited about the benefits of altruism, we also need to be 
mindful of drawbacks. In a way, my altruism toward you could be interpreted by 
you as a form of insurance and, as we all know, being insured can reduce effort. 
Or, in another context, my altruism toward you could render a threat of mine to 
punish any bad conduct by you not credible; after all, executing the punishment 
                                                 
1 Stark, 1989; Bergstrom and Stark, 1993. 
2 Lucas and Stark, 1985; Stark and Lucas, 1988; Lauby and Stark, 1988; Stark, 2009.  
3 Stark and Dorn, 2013. 
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will hurt me because your pain from being punished translates or converts into 
my pain.4  
 
Altruism may not also be the real reason for behavior that is seemingly 
motivated by altruism. Suppose that you have a dollar to give, and that there are 
two potential recipients: one who is poor, another who is poorer. An altruism-
based prediction is that you will give the dollar to the poorer. But the opposite 
need not be true; namely, being observed to give the dollar to the poorer does 
not attest to you being altruistic; you can so donate because of “the transfer 
value of gratitude:” the poorer will appreciate the dollar more than will the poor 
and, correspondingly, his disposition to reciprocate and his intensity of gratitude 
will be greater. Thus, a dollar given to the poorer will “buy” you more gratitude 
than a dollar given to the poor. If you value this response of the recipient, you 
will give the dollar to the poorer, but not for any altruistic reasons.5 
 
We mentioned at the outset that altruism and dissatisfaction at having less than 
others could interact. Consider a parent with two children who differ in their 
economic success. The parent contemplates possible bequests. A standard, 
altruism-based prediction is that more will be earmarked to the economically 
less successful child. But an insightful parent may think twice: ordinarily, 
children grow up together for a good many years, are regularly compared, are 
usually urged to follow (or not to follow) the example of other children in the 
family, and so on. Hence, in general, children constitute a natural reference 
group, and they tend to engage in intra-group comparisons. When one child 
receives a larger inheritance than the other child, the latter will experience 
relative deprivation; an altruistic parent may not want to cause that, in which 
                                                 
4 Bernheim and Stark, 1988; Stark, 1993; Stark, 1995.  
5 Stark and Falk, 1998. 
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case he will divide the bequest equally, thereby avoid engendering any sense of 
relative deprivation.6  
 
Now that we have alluded to this latter concept, let us run with it a little. A 
comparison with others, when the others fare better, is a source of dissatisfaction 
or stress, and it is quite natural to expect people to respond to this feeling.  
 
Take the case of migration. A widely held perception in writings on migration is 
that migration takes place only if there is a wage or an earnings differential. But 
assume that people are averse to relative deprivation. So, let there be two 
regions, let the cost of moving between the two regions be nil, let the two 
regions be identical to each other in all relevant respects, and let the individuals’ 
incomes be constant. This last assumption means that when an individual 
migrates, he takes along his income (as if he was born with that income, so to 
speak). The region in which an individual is, constitutes the individual’s 
exclusive comparison group. Individuals prefer to be in the region where their 
relative deprivation is lower. When there is a tie, individuals stay where they 
are. Suppose then that there are three individuals with incomes 9.1, 9, and 2 
who, to begin with, are all in region A. Now empty region B comes into being or 
becomes accessible. Then, individual 9.1 (the income of an individual is his 
name) will stay in region A because he has nothing to gain from moving to 
region B, but 9 and 2 will move to region B; 9 will get rid of his relative 
deprivation, and 2 will experience less relative deprivation when with 9 in B 
than with 9.1 in A. So, 2/3 of the population migrates, even though, in terms of 
wage or earnings, no one gains as a consequence of moving. 
 
This simple, steady-state outcome, reached after just one period, is, of course, 
not the only possibility. Suppose that there are four individuals with incomes 
                                                 
6 Stark and Zhang, 2002. 
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9.1, 9, 8, and 2, and that once again, to begin with, all the individuals are in 
region A. Now region B comes into being. Individuals 9, 8, and 2 see the 
attraction of moving there, and they all do. But imagine that the extent of 
relative deprivation is quantified in the following manner: it is the product of the 
fraction of those who earn more, and of their mean access earnings. Then, when 
2 is with 8 and 9, 
2
3
 are high earners, with a mean excess income of 
(9 2) (8 2) 13
2 2
    , and thus his relative deprivation will be 2 13 14
3 2 3
  , 




   , which is less than 14
3
; hence, moving to A is what 
indeed he will do. But then, when 2 is back in A, 8 will want to be in A too 
because even though he will have a little greater distance there from the top 
earner 9.1 than from the top earner 9 in B, the fraction of those who earn more 






. But once 8 is in A, 2 will prefer to be in B with 9 
rather than in A with 9.1 and 8, so he will move to B, and the process repeats 
itself ad infinitum; a steady state will not obtain. The elegance of this example 
(where 8 will always want to be where 2 is) emanates from the fact that the 
behavior of 8 arises not from reaping joy from having 2 to look down at, but 
rather from the presence of 2 reducing the agony from looking up at 9 or at 9.1.7 
 
The “marriage” of migration with relative deprivation does not end with the 
preceding constellation. We already mentioned assimilation. But we can say 
more. Imagine that in a country of destination there are two migrants who are 
clustered together and earn 2 each, and that there is a native who earns 7. By 
virtue of being close to each other, the two migrants compare themselves to each 
other, which yields no relative deprivation. Suppose that one of the two migrants 
                                                 
7 Stark and Wang, 2005.  
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considers assimilating, namely exerting an effort to learn the language, culture, 
and the native way of doing things, such that his earnings will rise to 3 (4 net of 
the cost of assimilation of 1), while at the same time, his comparison group will 
change as well, namely become that of himself and the native; moving along the 
assimilation road is moving in social space. Then, upon assimilation, his new 
“package” will be income 3 with a relative deprivation of 1 (7 3) 2
2
   . Suppose 
that the migrant attaches a positive weight to income, and a negative weight to 
relative deprivation. Then, if the latter weight is high enough, the value of his 
assimilation “package” will be lower than the value of his earnings cum zero 
relative deprivation when not assimilating. Even though assimilation confers an 
income gain, it will be rejected as an option because it comes along with a 
relative deprivation pain, and the gain may not be sufficient to compensate for 
the pain.8 
 
Behavioral responses to the sensing of relative deprivation can prompt us to 
question even some of the most cherished beliefs about income inequality and 
social welfare. A widely used measure of income inequality is the Gini index 
(Gini, 1912). Once again, consider a population of two individuals whose 
different incomes 1x  and 2x  are such that 2 1x x . It is easy to see that in this case, 









   
In words, the Gini index is equal to relative deprivation divided by total income. 
For a century now, following in the steps of Pigou (1912) and Dalton (1920), it 
has been maintained that a rank-preserving transfer from a richer individual to a 
poorer individual - in our case, a rank-preserving transfer from individual 2 to 
individual 1 - will reduce inequality. It is not an exaggeration to say that the 
                                                 
8 Stark and Fan, 2007. 
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Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is a cornerstone of inequality measurement 
theory, and that the Gini index is the most widely used measure of inequality. 
Yet the principle may not hold if the individuals adjust their behavior in 
response to the transfer. Consider the following reasoning. The poorer individual 
seeks income for two reasons: to obtain income “for its own sake,” and to obtain 
income in order to hold at bay relative deprivation. When income is taken away 
from the richer individual, the relative deprivation sensed by the poorer is 
reduced, and his incentive to work in order to maintain a “bearable level” of 
relative deprivation is correspondingly weakened. Add to this the additional 
reduction in the relative deprivation of the poorer from receiving that very 
income that is taken away from the richer. As to the richer individual, it is 
reasonable to assume that he will adjust his working time (effort) such that he 
will not be subjected to as great a reduction in income as has been taken away 
from him, yet that this adjustment will fall short of neutralizing the (negative) 
transfer. When between them the two individuals end up working less than 
before, the sum of their incomes (the denominator of the Gini coefficient) will 
be smaller than the corresponding pre-transfer value. If the reduction in total 
income in the denominator is greater than the reduction in relative deprivation in 
the numerator, or if the reduction in total income in the denominator coincides 
with the numerator remaining constant, the ratio between the numerator and the 
denominator will rise, not fall, and income inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, will increase.9 
 
Finally, it will be telling to take a look at a fascinating conjunction of social 
welfare maximization and relative deprivation.  
 
Suppose, once again, that we have two individuals whose incomes are 1x  and 2x , 
and whose utility functions are 1 1 1 1( )u x x  and 2 2 2 2( )u x x , where 1 20 , 1    
                                                 
9 Sorger and Stark, 2013. 
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are constants. To ease reference, we will assume that total income is normalized 
as one, namely that 1 2 1.x x   We are interested in finding out how social 
planners will go about interfering with the prevailing income distribution so as 
to bring social welfare to a maximum. Clearly, such interference, if any, depends 
on the preferences of the social planner and on the social welfare function. We 
will look at three social planners: a utilitarian social planner, a Bernoulli-Nash 
social planner, and an egalitarian social planner. The utilitarian social planner 
seeks to maximize the sum of the individuals’ utilities; the Bernoulli-Nash social 
planner seeks to maximize the product of the individuals’ utilities; and the 
egalitarian social planner wants to equalize incomes.  
 
We look first at the protocol of the Bernoulli-Nash social planner: 
2











   , then, from the first order condition of a maximum, 
namely from 1 2 1(1 2 ) 0x   , we get that 1 1
2
x
  ; the Bernoulli-Nash social 
planner will divide incomes equally; this will be welcomed by the egalitarian 
social planner.  
 
We next walk into the shoes of the utilitarian social planner. His protocol is: 
1 1 2 2( )Max x x   subject to the constraint that 1 2 1.x x   
As long as 1 2  , this social planner will give all the income to the individual 
whose i , 1,2i   is higher. And even if 1 2  , then any distribution will be 
optimal. One of numerous such distributions will be equal incomes; but being 
one of very many, the likelihood of it occurring is essentially zero. So, here, the 
utilitarian social planner and the egalitarian social planner will not see eye to eye 
at all; they will be in conflict.  
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Really? What if the individuals care not only about their income but also about 
their relative deprivation? Quite remarkably, if the utilitarian social planner will 
only acknowledge this preference, then the utilitarian and the egalitarian social 
planners will be in perfect harmony; disagreement will vanish altogether, 
congruence will replace conflict. 
 
Here is why. 
 
Let the individuals’ utility functions be 1 2( , ) (1 )i i i i iu x x x RD    . Because we 
have two individuals, then when incomes are not equal, only one individual can 
be relatively deprived. Without loss of generality, let this individual be 
individual 1, which is equivalent to stating that 1
1
2
x  . (The case in which 
individual 2 is relatively deprived, namely the case of 2
1
2
x  , is symmetrical.) 
This consideration implies the following utility functions: 
 
For individual 1 
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
1
( , ) (1 ) ( )
2
u x x x x x      
or, because 1 2 1x x  ,  
1 1 2 1 1 1 1
1
( , ) (1 )( )
2
u x x x x     , 
and for individual 2 
2 2 2 2( )u x x . 
The marginal utility of individual 1 is then 
1 1 2
1 1 1 1
1
( , )
(1 )( 1) (1 ) 1
u x x
x
             
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  . 
Because 21  , the utilitarian social planner will transfer income from individual 
2 to individual 1 and will do so until he hits the constraint or, in other words, 
until he transfers as much as is allowed by the constraint 1
1
2




x  : incomes are equalized, exactly as the egalitarian social 
planner wants to have it.10 
 
So we have seen how recognition that relative deprivation matters can reconcile 
opposing views, and settle disputes. We have seen that the alignment of the 
stance of the utilitarian social planner with that of the egalitarian social planner 
does not come about because the former exhibits any altruism toward the latter. 
Indeed, it is instructive to have in place an example as to how recognition of the 
distaste for relative deprivation can pacify opponents, just as altruism can. 
 
In sum: there are many domains in which the incorporation of altruism and 
relative deprivation can point to novel perspectives and suggest rethinking, and 
possibly revising, long-held views. And, as we have seen, there are domains in 
which consideration of relative deprivation can substitute for the prevalence of 
altruism, and vice versa. Here is a fascinating sphere indeed for research on 





                                                 
10 Stark, Kobus, and Jakubek, 2012. 
 11 
References   
Bergstrom Theodore C. and Stark Oded (1993). How Altruism Can Prevail in an 
Evolutionary Environment, American Economic Review 83(2): 149-155. 
Bernheim B. Douglas and Stark Oded (1988). Altruism Within the Family 
Reconsidered: Do Nice Guys Finish Last?, American Economic Review 
78(5): 1034-1045.  
Dalton Hugh (1920). The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes, Economic 
Journal 30(119): 348-361. 
Gini Corrado (1912). Variabilità e Mutabilità  (Variability and Mutability). 
Reprinted in Pizetti E. and Salvemini T. (Eds.), 1955. Memorie di 
metodologica statistica . Rome: Libreria Eredi Virgilio Veschi. 
Lauby Jennifer L. and Stark Oded (1988). Individual Migration as a Family 
Strategy: Young Women in the Philippines, Population Studies 42(3): 473-
486. 
Lucas Robert E. B. and Stark Oded (1985). Motivations to Remit: Evidence 
from Botswana, Journal of Political Economy 93(5): 901-918.  
Pigou Arthur C. (1912). Wealth and Welfare. London: Macmillan. 
Sorger Gerhard and Stark Oded (2013). Income Redistribution Going Awry: 
The Reversal Power of the Concern for Relative Deprivation, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 86: 1-9. 
Stark Oded (1989). Altruism and the Quality of Life, American Economic 
Review 79(2): 86-90. 
Stark Oded (1993). Nonmarket Transfers and Altruism, European Economic 
Review 37(7): 1413-1424. 
 12 
Stark Oded (1995). Altruism and Beyond: An Economic Analysis of Transfers 
and Exchanges Within Families and Groups. Cambridge, New York, and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 
Stark Oded (2009). Reasons for Remitting, World Economics 10(3): 147-158. 
Stark Oded and Dorn Agnieszka (2013). Do Family Ties With Those Left 
Behind Intensify or Weaken Migrants’ Assimilation?, Economics Letters 
118(1): 1-5.  
Stark Oded and Falk Ita (1998). Transfers, Empathy Formation, and Reverse 
Transfers, American Economic Review 88(2): 271-276. 
Stark Oded and Fan C. Simon (2007). A Social Proximity Explanation of the 
Reluctance to Assimilate, Kyklos 60(1): 55-63. 
Stark Oded, Kobus Martyna, and Jakubek Marcin (2012). A Concern about Low 
Relative Income, and the Alignment of Utilitarianism with Egalitarianism, 
Economics Letters 114(3): 235-238. 
Stark Oded and Lucas Robert E. B. (1988). Migration, Remittances, and the 
Family, Economic Development and Cultural Change 36(3): 465-481. 
Stark Oded and Wang You Qiang (2005). Towards a Theory of Self-Segregation 
as a Response to Relative Deprivation: Steady-State Outcomes and Social 
Welfare, in Bruni Luigino and Porta Pier Luigi (Eds.), Economics and 
Happiness: Framing the Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Stark Oded and Zhang Junsen (2002). Counter-Compensatory Inter-Vivos 
Transfers and Parental Altruism: Compatibility or Orthogonality?, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 47(1): 19-25. 
 
 
